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ability to carry out this task, and so in one sense the model is a special case of
Lucas’ [Bell Journal of Economics, 9, pp. 508-523, (1978)] span of control framework. However, the model also relates ability to risk. As in Kihlstrom and Laffont [Journal of Political Economy, 87, pp. 719-748 (1979)], the entrepreneur
bears all risk. But while Kihlstrom and Laffont assume the entrepreneur bears all
risk and show that as a consequence the least risk averse become entrepreneurs,
in the present model all agents are risk neutral but entrepreneurs bear all risk as
an equilibrium outcome. The model is used to study the consequences of firm
growth driven by entrepreneurial learning or by rising demand.
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1. Introduction
Baumol’s (1968) well-known observation that the theoretical firm is “entrepreneurless” was accompanied by an enormous degree of pessimism that the state of
affairs would ever change. Almost forty years later, Bianchi and Henreckson
(2005: 370) were no more optimistic: “the entrepreneur ‘lacks operational definition’ and is too elusive to ever fit into the neoclassical model.” This continued
pessimism is surprising in view of the significant theorizing about the entrepreneur over the last few decades. We have learned much from the literature
spawned by the seminal contributions of Lucas (1978), Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979), and Holmes and Schmitz (1990), each of which focuses on a different facet
of entrepreneurship and management. In one sense, however, these pioneering
papers are very much in keeping with Baumol’s pessimism. Each is quite vague
about what exactly it is that entrepreneurs do. Lucas is most explicit: his model
“does not say anything about the nature of the tasks performed by managers,
other than that whatever managers do, some do it better than others.” [p. 511].
This paper analyzes a production technology in which I try to be a little more
specific about some of what entrepreneurs do. The essence of the production
technology is as follows. An entrepreneur hires n workers. Each worker carries
out exactly one unit of work per unit of time, so that n units of work are done in
the firm. The value of this work, however, depends entirely on the decisions of
the entrepreneur.1 Each unit of work has a well-defined direction. The entrepreneur must decide the direction he would like this work to take, and he is responsible for organizing workers in this direction. Conditional on the intended direction, the actual direction of individual workers depends on the success with which
the entrepreneur organizes his employees; the less directed are the employees, the
less progress they make in the intended direction.
Individuals are assumed to vary in their ability to organize workers. The model
predicts that the most able become entrepreneurs, while the least able become
employees. Among entrepreneurs, the most able manage the largest firms and
earn the most after paying the wage bill. Because better entrepreneurs manage
more workers, in equilibrium the productivity of workers is the same in large and
small firms. The model is obviously a version of Lucas’ (1978) span of control
1. For example, a typing pool produces a fixed number of words per day regardless of the
boss’s identity. How valuable this typing is, however, depends on the abilities of the boss.
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framework,2 but it also bears some relation to the work of Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979) on risk bearing and of Holmes and Schmitz (1990) on business transfers.
In Kihlstrom and Laffont, entrepreneurs are assumed to earn stochastic profits
that are the residual earnings after fixed payments to factors. In their framework,
some individuals are better suited to entrepreneurship because they are less risk
averse.3 Entrepreneurs also bear all risk in the present model, even though all
agents are risk neutral. The expected level and variability of firm output depends
only upon the ability of, and effort expended by, the entrepreneur. Any reward
scheme that does not require the entrepreneur to bear all risk induces insufficient
effort, and is therefore inefficient. Thus, in contrast to Kihlstrom and Laffont, in
which risk-bearing is a maintained assumption but is not efficient relative to arrangements in which employees share some of the risk, this paper produces riskbearing as a consequence of the task of organization.
The model predicts volatile earnings for entrepreneurs but not for wage workers
and, among entrepreneurs, a positive cross-sectional correlation between mean
earnings and their volatility. These predictions are also consistent with a framework in which attitudes to risk determine occupational choice. However, after
showing that the degree of risk aversion required to explain occupational choice
in PSID data far exceeds conventional estimates, Rosen and Willen (2002) conclude that risk attitudes cannot be a major determinant of the decision to become
self-employed. As previous empirical work imposes no a priori constraints on the
distribution of abilities, the present model provides an avenue to explain Rosen
and Willen’s results.
Section 2 analyzes the model in a static setting. Section 3 introduces dynamics of
two types. In the first, I assume that entrepreneurs (and possibly employees) can

2. In Lucas, individuals vary in their talent for management, and greater talent increases
the output that can be obtained from managing a given set of inputs. The same mechanism can be found in Rosen (1978, 1982), Calvo and Wellisz (1980), and Irigoyen (2002).
Murphy, Shliefer and Vishny (1991) explore the implications of the model for economic
development.
3. See also Kanbur (1979) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). Cressy (2000) and
Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2003) point out that variations in wealth or borrowing
constraints can induce different degrees of risk aversion among agents with identical preferences. Rigotti, Ryan and Vaithianathan (2005) have extended their framework to tolerance of ambiguity.
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learn over time to organize better. In the second, I assume that demand grows
over time. In both cases, firms grow as they age, and entrepreneurial earnings
rise. But other features of firm evolution depend upon the source of growth.
When growth is driven by learning, measured labor productivity rises if price
falls in equilibrium, and remains constant if price does not fall. In contrast, firm
and industry growth driven by rising demand induces a decline in productivity:
price increases induce entrepreneurs with unchanged ability to increase their payrolls to exploit the rising demand, but they do so at the cost of diluting their
control over workers. More substantively, demand driven growth (but not growth
driven by learning) may induce some entrepreneurs to sell their business to
agents with better organizational ability. The model predicts that businesses that
are transferred are above average size and earn greater profits, as is the case in
the two models of business transfers developed by Holmes and Schmitz (1990,
1995).
It is perhaps worth closing this section with a brief comment on terminology. I
have throughout this introduction referred to agents as either workers or entrepreneurs, while I have also clearly limited attention to a single, management,
function of the entrepreneur. Indeed, some of what follows is equally applicable to
managers, although managers do not usually have claims to the entire residual
profits of the firm after payment of fixed wages. For good or bad, this interchangeability of the terms entrepreneur and manager has a long history that
dates back to Say (1880), and Franco (2005) has noted that it has persisted in
much of the industrial organization literature that has followed Lucas (1978). Of
course, some observers may decide that this focus on a management function of
entrepreneurs ignores the most distinctive characteristics of entrepreneurship.
Notwithstanding these concerns, I shall use the term entrepreneur throughout,
although some readers may prefer the term small business owner.4

4. Bianchi and Henrekson (2005:355), for example, argue that “entrepreneurship is not
only management” and it is conducted in a setting replete with Knightian uncertainty, in
which risk cannot even be quantified. However, it is not obvious to me that the degree
and nature of risk provides an especially useful distinction between entrepreneurs and
managers. In our datasets, entrepreneurship is most frequently measured by selfemployment, and I am unconvinced that the CEO of, say, Ford, faces risk that is more
quantifiable than that faced by the entrepreneur setting up a landscaping business.
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2. The Model
An entrepreneur employs n workers, each of whom does one unit of work per period. How productive this work is depends upon how well each worker’s activity
is aligned with the entrepreneur’s strategy. The degree of alignment is a random
variable, but the expected distance between the strategy and the directed activity
depends upon the entrepreneur’s ability in direction and coordination. Figure 1
illustrates the implementation of this idea for n = 3 . The firm’s choice of strategy
is represented by the slope of the line OS. Each of three workers carries out one
unit of work, indicated by the lines x1, x2 and x3. The contribution of this work
toward meeting the firm’s goals depends upon the relation between the direction
of strategy and the direction of the worker’s effort. For example, the contribution
of worker 1 is found by connecting a line from a to OS, drawn normal to OS, and
measuring the distance along OS from the origin to the point y1. Clearly, if
worker effort and firm goals are perfectly aligned, y1 = 1 . I assume that no
worker contributes a negative amount, so the angle between xi, and OS cannot
exceed π / 2 radians.

Worker contributions are additive, so we can evaluate the contribution of all
three workers by the simple geometric expedient of moving the origin of x2 to a,
and the origin of x3 to b. The total contribution toward the firm’s strategy is
given by Y, measured along OS. The transformation of Y into output or profit
depends upon the entrepreneur’s choice of strategy.5 In this paper, I put the
question of strategy choice to one side, and take the liberty of interpreting Y as
output. It is therefore convenient to rotate the coordinates to suppress the strategy question, as shown in Figure 2. As each of the line segments xi has unit
length, the contribution of worker i to output is given by yi = cos (θi ) . The constraint −π / 2 ≤ θi ≤ π / 2 ∀i implies yi ∈ [0,1] ∀i .6
5. Readers will recognize a close affinity to the geometric analysis of forces applied to an
object in classical mechanics. One difference, however, is that the effective force in classical mechanics is indicated by the length of a line connecting the origin to point c.
6. The assumption that the contribution to output of worker i’s actions does not depend
on the activity of worker j contrasts sharply with the production technology in recent
models of coordination. In Dessein and Santos (2006), for example, the contribution to
output of a worker undertaking task i depends upon the actions of workers undertaking
all other tasks.
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Workers operate under imperfect direction and coordination; they do what they
are told but what they are told to do may not be perfectly aligned with the firm’s
strategy. Assume, therefore, that each θi is a random draw from a distribution F
with support on the interval [−π / 2, π / 2 ] . Note that the θi are not choices of
the workers; they are the consequences of directions from the entrepreneur, but
deviations from the optimal choice of zero should be thought of as mistakes. It is
convenient to separate the mean and variance of the θi , so I assume that F is
truncated normal with density
fθ (θ) =

e −θ

2

/ 2 σ2

σ 2π erf (π / (2 2σ ))

,

(1)

for θ ∈ [−π / 2, π / 2] , and zero otherwise. Recall that σ 2 is not the variance of θ.
With symmetric truncation around a zero mean, the variance is
2

var(θ) = σ −

2πe −π

2

/ 8σ2

2 erf (π / (2 2σ ))

,

(2)

which is nonetheless increasing in σ. The parameter σ is our measure of the degree of coordination effected by the entrepreneur. Perfect coordination is attained
whenever σ = 0 . At the other extreme, as σ → ∞ , f (θ) attains the uniform distribution on [−π / 2, π / 2 ] , so that limσ →∞ var(θ) = π 2 /12 . However, it is clear
from Figure 2 that we are primarily interested in the distribution of the contributions, yi. A simple transformation of (1) yields the required density:
2

fy (y ) =

2e

−(cos−1 (y )) / 2 σ 2

σ π (1 − y 2 ) erf (π / (2 2σ ))

(3)

for y ∈ [0, 1] , and zero otherwise. The expectation, E [y; σ ] is strictly decreasing
in σ, with E [y; 0] = 1 and lim σ →∞ E [y; σ ] = 2 / π . Even the worst coordinators
can own firms producing positive output, but they will produce substantially less
than the best. Similarly, var(y; σ) is strictly increasing in σ, with var(y; 0) = 0
and lim σ →∞ var(y; σ) = 1 2 − 4 π2 .

If σ did not vary with the number of workers to be directed, expected output for
6

a firm with n workers would be E [Y ; σ, n ] = nE [y; σ ] , indicating constant returns
to scale. Consequently, the best entrepreneur (with the lowest σ) would employ
all the workers and produce all the output. But of course, a single entrepreneur
will rapidly become thinly stretched as n rises, and his ability to direct individual
workers must consequently decline as a firm grows. A simple parameterization
that I will use here sets σ(n ) = n β / s with both β and s strictly positive and finite; all potential entrepreneurs face the same β, while s is larger for the better
ones. The extent of coordination is a function of both the ability of the entrepreneur and the effort he expends. In this subsection I treat s as an exogenous characteristic of the entrepreneur and so refer to it as an index of ability. In the next
subsection, I introduce entrepreneurial effort.
Let p denote the product price, and normalize wages to unity. Assuming further
that the opportunity cost for the entrepreneur is his foregone wage, the expected
net earnings of the entrepreneur, E [we ] , are
E we ; s, p) = E π; s ) − 1 =







max np
n



1

∫n
0



dy − (n + 1) .
2
β

π (1 − y ) erf (πs / (2 2n ))

2

sy 2e

β

2

−(cos−1 (y )) / 2(n β / s )

(4)

For the time being, p will be treated as an exogenous parameter, as though this
were an industry in a small country open to trade in the good. However, there is
an upper bound to the price. When s → 0 , revenues approach 2np / π , so E [we ]
is strictly positive for arbitrarily bad entrepreneurs managing arbitrarily large
firms whenever p > π / 2 . Thus, it is necessary to assume that p ≤ π / 2 .
2.1 Ability and Firm Size

The first result states that the best entrepreneurs operate the largest firms, which
replicates a central result in Lucas (1978):
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal firm size satisfies n(s ) = ϕ(p, β )s 1/ β .
PROOF. Differentiate (4) with respect to n and substitute ϕ = n / s 1/ β . Equating
the resulting expression to zero yields the first order condition for firm size,
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1

p

∫
0

2
2/β

 ye −(cos−1 (y )) / 2ϕ2 / β
2
πβe −π / 8ϕ
β
1/ β
−1

dy
+ 1/ β (cos (y )) + ϕ (1 − β )

1/ β
1 − y2
 2 erf (π / 2 2ϕ ) ϕ

2

=

 π

ϕ2 / β π
,
erf 
1/
β
 2 2ϕ 
2

(5)

which depends on s and n only through, ϕ. For any given p and β, there is a
unique solution to (5), ϕ(p, β ) , with ∂ϕ / ∂p > 0 and ∂ϕ / ∂β < 0 . This solution
is not finite if σ(n ) does not rise sufficiently rapidly with firm size. That is, there
exists a β * (p) < 1 such that ϕ(p, β ) < ∞ ∀β > β * (p) and ϕ(p, β ) → ∞
∀β ≤ β * (p) .7 In the former [latter] case, it is easy to verify that ϕ(p, β ) defines a
maximum [supremum] of (4). •
It will be no surprise that the integral in (4) cannot be evaluated analytically. To
provide some additional insight into the model, it is therefore useful to supplement the main propositions with some numerical evaluations. Figure 3 illustrates
the relationship between E [we ] and n for several values of s for the case β = 1
and p = π / 2 . As Proposition 1 established, the size of firm that maximizes the
entrepreneur’s expected income is clearly increasing in s. Expected profit is
higher for larger firms, and this is also a general result: if it were not, high-ability
entrepreneurs (who operate the larger firms) could match the firm size of lowability entrepreneurs and still outperform them. One’s intuition should be that n
rises more [less] rapidly with ability when β is small [large]. However, it is only
possible to solve for ϕ(p, β ) numerically; doing so for selected values of β yields
the plots shown in Figure 4, which are consistent with intuition.
2.2 Labor Productivity and Firm Size

How do unit output measures, such as labor productivity, vary with firm size?
The answer is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1. As
n(s ) = ϕ(β )s 1/ β , it immediately follows that σ = ϕ(p, β )β is constant. Hence,

7. When β = 1 and p = π / 2 , ϕ(p, β ) ≈ 0.56 . In the remainder of the paper, I assume
that β > β * .
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using (3), expected productivity is invariant to firm size and, therefore, to entrepreneurial ability.8 When β = 1 and p = π / 2 expected productivity is equal to
approximately 86 percent of the productivity that would prevail under perfect
coordination.9
PROPOSITION 2. For any given price, expected labor productivity is invariant to
firm size.
The invariance of expected productivity has important consequences for traditional empirical research that measures only hired factors of production. First,
the researcher would infer that the industry operates under a constant returns to
scale production technology. This inference leads the researcher to conclude that
firm size is indeterminate, which conclusion is supported directly by the observed
variation in firm size [cf. Rosen (1982, p. 316)]. The researcher further notes the
existence of residual profits after paying the wage bill and concludes that workers
are being paid less than their marginal product, presumably due to some sort of
market imperfection [cf. Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002)]. None of these conclusions would be correct.
In a similar vein, the variance of individual contributions to output is invariant
to firm size. The following proposition is an immediate consequence:
PROPOSITION 3. The variance of firm output increases with firm size at the rate
n. The variance of labor productivity declines with increasing employment at
the rate 1/ n .
The first statement is a trivially-familiar characteristic of firm size distributions:
split a sample into large and small firms, and the within-group variance of the
large firms is greater than the within-group variance of the small firms.10 The relationship between firm size and productivity is perhaps less readily apparent.
Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) study plant productivity in a substantial sample
8. The invariance of productivity to firm size is also a feature of Lucas (1978).
9. That is when σ ≡ 0 ∀n , in which case firm size is indeterminate. Expected productivity
is somewhat higher [lower] when β > [<] 1 , but numerical evaluations suggest productivity is not especially sensitive to variations in β. For example, a ten percent change in
β around β=1 is associated with a two percent change in expected productivity.
10. Because firm age and size are positively correlated, it is also the case that the variance of firm size increases with cohort age [e.g. Cabral and Mata (2003)].
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of large US plants. They construct two measures of plant productivity: one using
an econometric approach which attributes factor shares to stochastic deviations
from optimization, the other using a Solow residual approach that attributes to
factor remuneration variations in output that may arise from randomness in the
production process. The former concept of productivity is more consistent with
the present model, and we summarize their results from that approach. They
find: (i) larger plants are not more productive than smaller plants;11 (ii) productivity is not correlated with age; and (iii) larger plants are less likely to move up
or down in relative productivity rankings.12 The model’s predictions about productivity are consistent with this evidence.
2.3 Factor Shares

In this subsection, I replicate another result from Lucas (1978). Using the optimal
employment level, n = φ(p, β )s 1/ β , to eliminate s from (4) yields an expression
showing that residual profits after wages are proportional to n. The key result
follows immediately:
PROPOSITION 4. The entrepreneurial rent share, E [π ]/ (E [π ] + n )), is independent of firm size.
Of course, as n is an increasing function of ability, the model allows for possibly
significant variation in entrepreneurs’ incomes.
2.4 Entrepreneurial Risk Bearing

Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) have argued that a key function of the entrepreneur is to bear risk. They analyze a model in which inputs are paid fixed wages
and the entrepreneur receives the residual profit, which is stochastic. But why is
this particular arrangement appropriate? In the present model, it can be justified

11. This is their only finding in the list that is not robust to methodology. With productivity measured by Solow residuals, productivity rises with size. Bartelsman and Dhrymes
(1998) note that they have no explanations for the difference in results. Outlon (1998)
tentatively concludes that large British firms may be less productive than small firms,
while Lentz and Mortenson (2005) observe no relationship between employment and labor productivity among Danish firms.
12. Palangkaraya, Stierwald and Yong (2005) replicated this result for large Australian
firms.
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on efficiency grounds. Workers accomplish the same amount of work regardless of
where they work; the risk associated with their contribution to output depends
only on the coordination activity of the entrepreneur. Of course, in the absence of
choice variables any means of distributing the firm’s product would be equally
efficient. In this section, I introduce entrepreneurial effort, e, and assume that
σ is a function of effort, rather than ability. The intuition is then straightforward:
any payment scheme that assigns to workers a positive fraction of residual profits
after payment of fixed wages reduces the entrepreneur’s effort below the optimal
level. This reduces revenues, and the firm is less valuable than to an entrepreneur
who offers a purely fixed wage. Efficiency requires that the entrepreneur receives
the full marginal product of effort, and an incidental consequence of this is that
he also bears all the risk.
More formally, let Rn (e) denote expected revenues for a firm with n workers,
conditional on entrepreneurial effort. Assume Rn is an increasing concave function
of effort,13 and let the cost of effort be unity. Suppose the entrepreneur pays himself a fixed wage, v, and he offers workers a fixed wage, w, plus a fraction of residual profits, α (Rn (e) − v − wn ) / n , to each worker. The remainder of the residual profits go to the entrepreneur. If all agents are risk neutral, it must be the
case that wn = (n − α (Rn (e) − v )) /(1 − α) , so that the income expected from
working for this firm equals the fixed wage offered by other firms. If the entrepreneur can commit to the level of effort when contracting with workers, the
value of α does not matter. In this case, his expected net earnings are


n − (αRn (e) − v )
 + v − e
we (e) = (1 − α) Rn (e) − v −
1−α


= (Rn (e) − e ) − n ,

(6)

which does not depend upon α. With commitment, any degree of profit sharing is
equally efficient. This is not the case when the entrepreneur cannot commit to a
particular level of effort. Let w(α) denote the wage set upon hiring workers. The
entrepreneur’s effort is the solution to

13. A simple parameterization for effort substitutes e = s in (4). This yields an increasing quasi-concave function, which suffices for what follows.
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e * (α) = arg max {(1 − α) (Rn (e) − v − nw * (α)) + v − e } ,

(7)

e

yielding the first order condition Rn′ (e * ) = (1 − α)−1 , so that e * (α) and
Rn e * (α) − e * (α) are strictly decreasing in α. Given the fixed wage bill,
w e * (α) n = (n − αRn e * (α) − αv ) /(1 − α) the entrepreneur’s net income is [from
(6)] we e * (α) = (Rn e * (α) − e * (α)) − n , which is strictly decreasing in α.14 Any
reward scheme that does not fully reward the entrepreneur for his effort is therefore inefficient. Moreover, in contrast to Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), entrepreneurs bear all risk even though everyone is risk neutral.
The analysis is more complicated if agents are risk averse, because there are three
interacting effects of profit sharing. For a given level of effort, the entrepreneur’s
expected utility rises if he can substitute a fixed payment for part of his claim on
residual profits. In order to do so, however, he must raise the expected earnings
of workers to compensate them for accepting risk. Finally, of course, any change
in the wage structure designed to diversify risk has direct consequences for the
optimal amount of effort. Ignoring this last consequence (i.e. when effort is exogenous), there is likely to be profit sharing, except when entrepreneurs are sufficiently wealthy relative to employees. Because larger firms ceteris paribus yield
larger residual profits for the entrepreneurs, this implies that the degree of profit
sharing [the fraction of risk borne by the entrepreneur] declines [rises] with firm
size. When effort is endogenous, the outcome depends on the productivity of entrepreneurial effort relative to the degree of risk aversion. If output is sufficiently
sensitive to effort, then the entrepreneur will continue to bear all risk. In intermediate cases, a conditional form of Kihlstrom and Laffont’s main result survives: if there is variation in risk aversion between agents with equal ability, then
the least risk averse are the most appropriate entrepreneurs.
2.5 Risk and Return

Expected output per worker is independent of firm size, n, as is the entrepreneurial rent share. It then follows that entrepreneurial income is proportional to firm
size. As the variance of output is proportional to firm size, the model generates a

14. Of course, n will also vary with α. But this serves simply to strengthen the finding.
An entrepreneur with firm size n and profit sharing level α>0 will prefer to reduce α to
zero and increase his income. He may then decide to alter n and further increase income.
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positive correlation between the mean and variance of entrepreneurs’ earnings.
This positive correlation is consistent with the conventional wisdom that risk
aversion demands a risk premium, but in the present model it arises as an equilibrium response to variations in ability across risk-neutral entrepreneurs.
Using data from the PSID, Rosen and Willen (2002) confirm that the selfemployed have higher and more volatile income than wage earners, but then proceed to question whether risk aversion can explain the apparent risk premium for
self-employment. They find that the degree of relative risk aversion required to
explain occupational choice exceeds conventional estimates by an order of magnitude,15 and hence that risk attitudes cannot be a major determinant of the decision to become self-employed.16 As previous empirical work imposes no a priori
constraints on the distribution of abilities, the present model’s link between ability and income variance may be a plausible explanation of Rosen and Willen’s
results.
2.6 General Equilibrium

The analysis so far has been of the “partial partial equilibrium” type: I have
treated both the wage of workers and the price of output as exogenous data, and
analyzed optimality in a single firm. In this subsection, I derive the equilibrium
of an economy characterized by the production technology in (3). For compactness, I revert to the setting in which effort does not matter. All individuals may
either produce one unit of work as a wage earner, or they may run a single firm
with success that depends on ability, s.
Two equations determine equilibrium. The first is the zero profit condition for
the marginal entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial earnings increase with s, so for any
given price there is a critical skill level, s , satisfying E [we ; p, s ] = 0 , such that

15. Among the less [more] educated, the coefficient of relative risk aversion required to
explain employment is 129 [55], compared with conventional estimates of between 1 and
3. An alternative interpretation is that a model of occupational choice driven only by risk
aversion explains only about one percent of the observed difference in consumption levels
between the self-employed and wage earners.
16. A rather different puzzle is raised by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), who
study the return to financial investment in public and private equity portfolios. They find
that the returns are about the same but, because private equity portfolios tend to be
much less diverse, their risk is much greater.
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individuals with s ≥ s become entrepreneurs and the remainder become employees. As E [we ; p, s ] rises with p, it is clear that s falls with p. Output per worker
in the marginal firm tends to one as s → ∞ so, with a wage of unity, it follows
that lims →∞ p(s ) = 1 . At the other extreme, as s → 0 , output per worker tends
to 2 / π and for given n lims → 0 E [we ; p, s ] = n(2p / π − 1) − 1 . Thus, lims → 0 p(s ) =
π(n + 1)/ 2n . As n becomes unbounded for any p ≥ π / 2 , lims → 0 p(s ) =
limn →∞ π(n + 1)/ 2n = π / 2. The pairs of values {p, s } satisfying the zero-profit
condition, E [we ; p, s ] = 0 , define a negatively-sloped line bounded between p = 1
and p = π / 2 . This is shown in Figure 5 as the line ZP.
The second equation is a full employment constraint. Let the population be N
and let F(s) denote the distribution of ability in the economy. Then a fraction
1 − F (s ) of the population becomes entrepreneurs. As each entrepreneur with
ability s employs ϕ(p, β )s 1/ β workers, the full employment constraint is
1
1 − F (s ) +
N

∞

∫ ϕ(p, β)s

1/ β

dF (s ) = 1 .

s

Differentiating yields
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(8)

f (s ) (N + ϕ(p, β )s 1/ β )
∂p
=
> 0,
∞
∂s
ϕp ∫ s 1/ βdF (s )

(9)

s

where ϕp = ∂ϕ / ∂p . From (8), it is clear that p must increase without bound as
s → ∞ , else the integral term vanishes. At the other extreme, as s → 0 , we require that ϕ(p, β ) → 0 for all s, which in turn requires that price falls to unity.
The full employment constraint, indicated by the line FE in Figure 5, consequently traces a positively-sloped relationship between p and s , beginning below
ZP and then rising above it. As a result, there is a unique equilibrium.
There are few free parameters to concern ourselves about much in the way of
comparative statics. One exception concerns changes in the distribution of skills.
An increase in the ability of all agents induces every incumbent entrepreneur to
increase employment. This violates the full employment constraint, and the
change in ability must be offset at any given price by a reduction in the number
of entrepreneurs. Thus, FE shifts right. The net result is a reduction in the equilibrium price, and an increase in s . An improvement in the technology for organizing workers, captured parametrically by, for example, a reduction in β, shifts
both lines. For any given value of s, profits rise as β falls, so the zero profit condition implies price must fall at each s . Similarly, for each s, optimal employment rises, so price must also fall at each s in the full employment constraint.
Thus, both FE and ZP shift down, inducing a reduction in price, but an ambiguous effect on the identity of the marginal entrepreneur.

3. Entrepreneurial Learning and Demand Growth
This section considers in partial equilibrium the implications of the model for
firm growth and industry dynamics. Two engines of growth are considered. In the
first, growth is driven by entrepreneurial learning. In the second, firms grow in
response to secular increases in demand. Subsection 3.1 briefly considers growth
of a single firm in an otherwise static industry, while subsections 3.2 and 3.3 consider some consequences of the two engines of growth. Throughout this section, I
set β = 1 in order to reduce notation.
3.1 Firm Growth

The expected output of a firm run by an entrepreneur with skill s is
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1

E [y(s )] =

2

sy 2e

∫

−(cos−1 (y )) / 2ϕ( p )2

π (1 − y 2 ) erf (π / (2 2ϕ(p)))

0

dy

= φ(p)s ,

(10)

where φ ′(p) > 0 . Output is clearly increasing in both s and p. Expected labor
productivity is
E [y(s )]

φ(p)
=
=
n(s )
ϕ(p)

1

2

y 2e

−(cos−1 (y )) / 2ϕ ( p )2

∫ ϕ(p) π (1 − y ) erf (π / (2
2

0

2ϕ(p)))

dy ,

(11)

which is decreasing in p and (consistent with Proposition 2) independent of s. It
immediately follows that the two engines of growth have different consequences
for firm characteristics. If the entrepreneur improves his organizing skills over
time, the resulting increases in s raise output for given n and, further, induce the
firm to increase employment. However, the increase in employment exactly offsets the effect of higher ability on individual workers. As a result, growth driven
by entrepreneurial learning is characterized by rising output and employment,
but constant labor productivity. When growth is driven by improvements in
market conditions, reflected here by an increase in the price, output and employment rise, but in this case firm growth is accompanied by declining labor
productivity.
3.2 Growth from Learning

Assume there is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs with measure one, and
that there exists an outside option paying a unit wage. Denote demand by
D(p) = Ag(p), g ′(p) ≤ 0, so that A is a convenient scaling factor. To derive industry supply, recall that the marginal entrepreneur’s skill level satisfies the zero
profit condition, pφ(p)s − (ϕ(p)s + 1) = 0. Using (10), the industry supply curve
is given by
∞

Y (p) = φ(p) ∫ sdF (s ) ,

(12)

−1

is decreasing in p. Market equilibrium requires that

s (p )

where s (p) = ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p))
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∞

Ag (p) − φ(p) ∫ sdF (s ) = 0 .

(13)

s (p )

To consider the effect of learning, replace s with s + αh(s ) for some α ≥ 0 , and
some non-negative function h(s). This characterization of course implies that all
agents with ability s learn at exactly the same rate. If h(s ) = 0 for all s ≤ s , only
incumbent entrepreneurs learn, while if h(s ) > 0 for any s ≤ s , some employees
also learn about coordinating inputs. Market equilibrium then requires that
∞

Ag(p) − φ(p)

∫

[s + αh(s )]dF (s ) = 0 .

(14)

s ( p )−αh (s ( p ))

Differentiating (14) with respect to α and evaluating at α = 0 yields

p ′(α) = −

φ(p)∫

∞

s (p )

φ ′(p)∫

∞

s (p )

h(s )dF (s )

sdF (s ) − φ(p)sf (s )s ′(p) − Ag ′(p)

<0.

(15)

The effects of learning are straightforward. The rightward shift in the supply
curve is given in the numerator, and the induced decline in price (and increase in
industry output) depends on the slopes of the supply and demand functions. Recalling that φ(p)s is the expected output of a firm indexed by skill level s, the
term φ(p)h(s )d α is the increase in expected output for a type s firm that is realized when price is held constant. The numerator sums this increase in output
over all entrepreneurs. The slope of the supply curve is given by the first two
terms in the denominator. The first of these sums over all incumbents the change
in expected firm output induced by the decline in market price. The second is the
change in output induced by a change in the marginal entrepreneur.
Equation (15) cannot tell us whether learning induces exit of incumbent entrepreneurs, or the creation of employee startups. To see this, note that the skill
level of the marginal entrepreneur satisfies
−1

s (p(α)) + αh (s (p(α))) = ( p(α)φ(p(α)) − ϕ(p(α))) ,
from which we obtain
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(16)

ds
dα

α=0

 pφ ′(p) + φ(p) − ϕ ′(p)
 p ′(α) .
= −h(s ) − 
2

 ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p))


(17)

Learning by the marginal agent has a direct, negative, effect, −h(s ), on the value
of s , which induces employee startups. Opposing this is a positive price effect on
s , which encourages exit by incumbents and discourages employee startups. Either effect may dominate. For example, under perfectly elastic demand, learning
can only induce entry. On the other hand, if learning is limited to incumbent entrepreneurs, then it can only induce exit.
We already know that, holding price constant, an increase in entrepreneurial ability has no impact on labor productivity, while a decline in price with ability held
constant raises productivity. As a result, supply-side growth will be associated in
equilibrium with rising productivity among incumbents. However, average productivity in the industry may not rise if learning is limited to employees who
then create startups, because mass is then being added to the lower end of the
skill distribution of entrepreneurs.
3.3 Growth from Expanding Demand

The effects of growth driven by increased demand is captured by a rightward
shift of the demand curve. For example, the price effect of an increase in A is

p ′(A) =

g (p )
φ ′(p)∫

∞

s (p )

sdF (s ) + φ(p)sf (s )s ′(p) − Ag ′(p)

> 0,

(14)

The interpretation is entirely standard: growth through expanding demand raises
price and quantity; it induces increased output by incumbents at the cost of declining labor productivity; and it induces new entrants.
Entrepreneurs may seek to avoid the declining productivity induced by demand
growth by selling the firm to a new owner with greater ability, who is more able
to exploit the profit opportunities offered by expanding demand. A complete
analysis of business transfers is beyond the scope of this paper; it requires, for
example, that we specify how entrepreneurs are born and retire, as in the two
models of Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995). But without undertaking a complete
dynamic analysis, it is possible to draw a comparison with some of results from
Holmes and Schmitz’ analyses of business transfers. In their first model, agents
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differ in their ability to develop new businesses, but all agents are equally gifted
at managing existing businesses. The most capable agents therefore are quick to
sell businesses so they can get back to the task of new business development. The
model predicts that firms that are transferred are on average better quality than
firms that are not, and the agents who sell business are more able than those who
do not. In their second model, there is no distinction between business development and management, and all agents are ex ante identical. The profitability of a
business depends both on its quality and the quality of the match between the
business and the entrepreneur. The model predicts that poor matches are likely
to result in quick transfers of ownership. However, better business are also more
likely to be sold, because the value of a good match is greater the better the quality of the business.
The present model is also consistent with the prediction that better quality firms
(i.e. those with the greatest increases demand) are more likely to be transferred.
What about the quality of the entrepreneur? The present model predicts that
lower quality entrepreneurs are more likely to sell business, because entrepreneurs
transfer businesses that have become too large given their ability to organize labor. Although the present model depends upon permanently differing abilities,
this result is more in line with Holmes and Schmitz’ (1995) second model.17 Intuitively, an expansion of firm size in the face of fixed entrepreneurial ability is
analogous to a decline in match quality.
To establish these results, consider the following simple thought experiment.
There exist a set of incumbent entrepreneurs with skill levels drawn from the distribution F (s ) , each of whom produces a unique product that initially sells at a
common price, p0 . Subsequently, each entrepreneur experiences an improvement
in the quality of his product as perceived by consumers, which translates into a
rise in the price for his product. Let G (p) denote the distribution of random price
draws, with G (p0 ) = 0 and G (p ) = 1 for some p ≤ π / 2 . There is also a set of
potential buyers of these firms, which consists of agents with abilities, s ′ , also
drawn from the distribution F (s ′) . Each incumbent is matched at random with
17. And it is more in line with evidence indicating that transferred businesses were underperforming. For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) find that transferred businesses had lower initial levels of productivity but higher subsequent growth. McGuckin
and Ngyen (1995) also report that the productivity of acquired plants rises following a
takeover. See Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995) for discussion of further evidence.
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one member of the set of potential buyers. Let H (s ′ − s ) , denote the distribution
of the difference between the abilities of the (potential) buyers and sellers, noting
that H (0) = 1 2 . The incumbent may sell to his match with a transfer cost k, and
he will do so if there is a net surplus to be had from the transfer. Recalling that
expected profits for an entrepreneur are E [we | s, p ] = ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)) s + 1, the
gain from transferring a business from an agent with ability s to one with ability
s ′ is ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)) (s ′ − s ) − k , where ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)) is positive and increasing in
p. Hence, a transfer therefore takes place only if s ′ − s ≥ k / ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)) . That
is, the potential buyer must have strictly greater ability than the incumbent, but
the difference is decreasing in the quality of the firm’s product. As a result, p
tends to be higher than average for transferred businesses, while s tends to be
lower than average.18
More formally, let P (s ′ − s ) be the lowest price that satisfies
s ′ − s ≥ k / ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)), so that p* = max[ p0 , P (s ′ − s )] is the minimum price
at which a transfer takes place. It then follows that
E  p | ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p)) ≥ k /(s ′ − s )
∞

= 2∫
0

∞

≥ 2∫
0

p

1
pdG (p)dH (s ′ − s )
1 − F (p*) ∫
p*
p

∫ pdG(p)dH (s ′ − s)
p0

∞

p

= 2∫ dH (s ′ − s )∫ pdG (p)
p0

0

p

=

∫ pdG(p) ,

(15)

p0

so businesses that are transferred are on average better quality. Conversely, we
have

18. Note also that higher growth rates for p induce more businesses to be transferred.
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E s | s ≤ s ′ − k / ( pφ(p) − ϕ(p))
p

=

∞

∫∫
p

0

1
F (min[s ′, S (s ′, p)])
∞

p

≤ ∫ dG (p)∫
p

∞

≤∫
0

0

min[s ′, S (s ′, p )]

∫

sdF (s )dF (s ′)dG (p)

s

s′]

1
sdF (s )dF (s ′)
′
F (min[s , S (s ′, p)]) ∫s

s′

1
sdF (s )dF (s ′)
F (s ′) ∫s

= E s | s ≤ s ′
< E [s ] ,

(16)

so the ability of entrepreneurs who transfer their business is on average lower.

4. Conclusions
This paper has explored one possible answer to the question: what is it that entrepreneurs (and managers) do? Perhaps more precisely, it has explored what
there is to learn from developing a tractable model of one particular activity—
coordinating the efforts of workers. Coordination is of course not the only task for
the entrepreneur. Hellman (2007), for example, has recently analyzed the essential task of collecting resources. Nonetheless, coordination does seem to be an important activity and, as in previous work, there is likely something to learn from
focusing on a single activity to the exclusion of others.
There are undoubtedly also a variety of ways in which one might model this coordination activity. The approach taken in this paper is especially tractable, but
it also provides some substance, or ‘microstructure’ to the activities only implicitly present in Lucas’ (1978) classic paper. Moreover, it does so in a way that
relates the ability of the entrepreneur to coordinate workers to the implications
drawn from very different models of entrepreneurial behavior. In particular, the
model provides an endogenous explanation for why entrepreneurs are risk bearers
in equilibrium, an activity that was simply assumed to be a task of entrepreneurs
in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). It also replicates some key implications about
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business transfers that Holmes and Schmitz (1990) derived in framework that
focused on the inventive activity of entrepreneurs.
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